If the practice of federalism departs from a "watertight compartments" model it can complicate voters' efforts to hold governments accountable. At a minimum, accountability involves principals (voters) removing their agents (governors) if the principals judge the effects of the agents' actions to be unsatisfactory. However, when voters in a federal system evaluate government performance, voting "retrospectively,"
1 they must assess the degree of responsibility each order of government bears for a given policy outcome. This is not simple, given the myriad intergovernmental arrangements now common in federations. Adding to the confusion, governments complicate matters deliberately, passing the buck and stealing credit.
2 There is little impartial, expert opinion that might guide voters in finding the truth amidst intergovernmental bickering or even intergovernmental cooperation. Under these conditions, voters who see something amiss may find it difficult to translate that judgment into an effective voting decision.
This concern is not specific to federalism. It resonates with both the voluminous American literature on divided government and with a growing It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated where there are a number of actors who may have different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.
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Not only did Hamilton make this detailed diagnosis of the way the problem originates at the elite level, but he also pointed out the effect on the voting public: citizens do not have the incentives to spend all their time and resources looking for misconduct in the government. He asked, "who is there that will either take the trouble, or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction?" Will there be "a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task . . ." 6 Hamilton's argument applies to any institutions that provide for shared responsibility. His theoretical achievement was to identify the potential conflict between accountability to other branches of government and accountability to voters.
Research on voter behavior under divided government has demonstrated that voters, not the best-informed bunch in the first place, 7 are not all that (February 2003): 190-215 . 4 Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 70," The Federalist Papersed. Clinton Rossiler (New York: Mentor, 1961) , p. 424.
5 Ibid., [427] [428] Ibid., 428. 'Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics And Why It Matters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) . sophisticated in their attributions of responsibility. 8 As Hamilton pointed out, they have little incentive to seek out this complicated, often conflicting information. American research shows that the president, not the Congress, is blamed or credited in most policy domains. Congressional candidates merely feel the partisan backdraft of presidential approval or disapproval, especially in areas like the economy. 9 Nevertheless, many studies show that "accountability is generally stronger under unified party control than under divided government." 10 Comparative work demonstrates that voters exert accountability more powerfully as the "clarity of responsibility" increases.
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The literature on federalism acknowledges that responsibility can be clouded, and accountability threatened, when multiple governments are involved in policy. 12 However, analysis of the extent or seriousness of this problem lags behind analysis of voters' response to other forms of divided power. The threat to accountability seems to have been taken as the price to be paid for federalism's vaunted advantages. But how steep is the price? If federal confusion reduces the incentive for governments to pursue policies that satisfy citizens, is the price worth paying?
Once these questions are on the table, it becomes apparent that there is more to the issue than a simple threat to electoral accountability. There may be different effects in different policy areas, altering the policy agenda. There may be different effects for existing and new policies, affecting governments' propensity to innovate. The confusion might deter voters from retrospective evaluation of governments, inclining them toward prospective judgments based on political personalities or policy positions. If only better-informed citizens can cope with federalism's challenges, the confusion might mute some voices while amplifying others. It also might weaken the incentive to vote, possibly in some groups more than in others. Finally, in a deep irony, to the extent that voters throw up their hands at the confusion and treat all governments as a unit, federalism becomes merely an administrative arrangement, and likely an inefficient one at that. This study takes steps toward answers to some of these questions by examining new survey data from Canada. The principal question is whether voters who attribute responsibility to both the federal and provincial governments use retrospective evaluations in their voting decisions as strongly as do those who think responsibility lies predominantly with one or the other order of government. This question is assessed with panel survey data from federal and provincial elections in Canada in 2000 and 2001.
A MODEL OF FEDERAL VOTING BEHAVIOR
The analysis begins with a simple model depicting the evaluation of multiple governments in a federation. The model confines itself to voters judging the acceptability of the government in power, either federal or provincial, ignoring the more complicated task of comparing the government with alternatives. Approval of the government is prior to a consideration of the alternatives, and the criteria for approval are predominantly retrospective. I adapt the standard portrayal of voter i's utility U. from government g being determined in part by the distance between that voter's policy position X. k on issue k and the position the voter attributes to the government, P. k on that issue, summing over all issues. The other element in the calculus is a residual category L. (e.g., leaders) that includes all determinants of the voter's evaluation of the government other than the policy and performance areas explicitly included in the first term.
In the context of retrospective performance-evaluation, the voter's position X. k is his or her expectation for what a government should have been able to do-for more sophisticated voters, what an alternative governing party would have done-while the government position P. k is the voter's assessment of that government's actual performance in that policy area. Put another way, the voter asks, for each policy area: "Did the government live up to (my personal) expectations?" I call this analog of policy distance "performance distance." Obviously, the traditional interpretation and this accountability interpretation of the standard policy-voting model can coexist in an empirical implementation.
I add responsibility to the standard model in much the same way as in models of issue salience or concern," where a voter-specific responsibility weight, R. k , applies to each policy area. The model is:
The scale of R k is arbitrary, but it is convenient to think of it on the unit interval representing the proportion of total responsibility borne by I3 A fuller version of the model also incorporates a term for salience, so that the impact of policy is mediated by both responsibility and each voter's concern for that policy area. It is omitted here because the survey used in this analysis did not measure salience for all issues. government g. A high value of R k means that a policy area is heavily weighted in the voter's calculus, while a low value means that the policy area is less important.
The model implies two behavioral possibilities: issue bias and "a pox on both your houses." They are not mutually exclusive. Ideally, we would want to be able to capture their effects in a model of the voting decision in a federation. The two possibilities can be illustrated by imagining a twoissue election, where issue 1 is a standard prospective, positional issue (e.g., tax cuts), and issue 2 is a retrospective, performance issue (e.g., economic performance).
Issue Bias
Voters may ignore (or perhaps dwell on) issues where they do not assign exclusive responsibility to one government. Imagine a case where on issue 2, voters attribute moderate responsibility to both governments (R R and R s2 = .5, where the subscripts replace g, and indicate federal or state). These voters might be certain thatjurisdiction is shared, or they might be uncertain as to which government is responsible. If responsibility is zero-sum, and voters are fully rational, these voters' performance judgments should affect their vote choice in both federal and provincial arenas about half as strongly as those who attribute exclusive responsibility to one government or the other. But if there is an issue bias, the inability to attribute exclusive responsibility might incline voters to ignore that issue and turn to one where responsibility is clearer, or else to use non-policy criteria. Voters might throw up their hands at intergovernmental bickering that makes attributions of responsibility difficult, ignoring areas where they think jurisdiction is muddled. The bias could conceivably operate in the opposite direction, where voters dwell on issues where responsibility is uncertain, though that seems unlikely.
A Pox (Blessing) on Both Your Houses
In contrast, some voters might genuinely believe that the contribution of both governments is a necessary condition for a given policy outcome. If they are uncertain about responsibility, they might hedge their bets and attribute full responsibility to both governments. Thus, I do not impose a restriction that responsibility is zero-sum (R f + R s = 1), even though that is logically true. Voters, particularly those who face non-concurrent federal and provincial elections, might hold both governments responsible to the same degree for the same government-induced conditions (R,. = R s , for k f =k s ). This possibility is more plausible for state-of-the-world judgments on valence (or "motherhood") issues than on positional issues, although it applies in the latter case if voters cannot distinguish the positions of the two governments (P in = P isl )-The result would be full and equal impact from a performance judgment on voting decisions in both electoral arenas. The risk is that if both governments then respond to this electoral signal, voters may get a stronger response than they bargained for. If negative, the word "pox" is apt, but this phenomenon could operate in the other direction if times are particularly good and the citizen's province or state is not disadvantaged relative to the federation in general. Voters might be uncertain which government to credit, and so reward them both with support.
DATA AND METHODS
To understand how the federal context affects voters' ability to hold their governments accountable, the ideal survey design is to interview the same voters in the context of both federal and provincial or state elections. The survey data used here were collected by a telephone survey following the 2001 provincial elections in Alberta and British Columbia (BC), Canada. The respondents were those who had previously been interviewed (by telephone) during and after the 2000 federal election by the Canadian Election Study (CES). The data are therefore a three-wave panel: the first interview during the federal campaign of 2000, the second after the campaign, and the third immediately after the provincial election in the spring of 2001. Because only a short interview was necessary to supplement the CES data, the response rate to these re-interviews was high, 79 percent. There were 212 completed interviews in Alberta and 241 in BC, for a combined N of 453.
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The surveys included questions on the prominent issues in the two provincial campaigns: health care and the economy in both provinces, the environment in BC, and energy prices in Alberta. Each issue question was followed by the question: "which government is mostly responsible" for the situation? Response options in the provincial surveys included "both" and "don't know." The federal survey did not offer, but did accept, these responses for a question about health care. Respondents were therefore not being asked to do the impossible and assign exclusive responsibility. They were not offered a false choice between the vagueness of "both" and the absurdity (on most issues) of an either-or choice. Voters who chose "both governments," therefore, really do see shared, joint responsibility.
Ideally, identical measurements would be available for the prominent issues in the federal election campaign, but they are not. Fortunately, the M The project was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada's Federalism and Federations Program. The telephone survey fieldwork was carried out by the Institute for Social Research at York University, and was conducted by the same technical team, using the same protocol, as the 2000 Canadian Election Study (CES). Full technical documentation on the CES study, which randomly selected the respondents that were re-interviewed for this study, is available at http:// www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces-eec/documents/CES_TD_001.pdf. The original response rates were 63 percent in British Columbia and 56 percent in Alberta. There were 303 respondents in BC and 273 in Alberta who were eligible for this study. The response rate for this provincial wave of the panel was 78 percent for Alberta and 80 percent for BC, or 78.6 percent overall. The assistance of the CES team (Andr Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte) and David Northrup of ISR is gratefully acknowledged. None of these individuals are responsible for any of this author's errors. The data are weighted by the western Canada household weight provided in the CES data file.
health-care questions in the federal study have a reasonably similar format for responsibility. The economic questions are less similar, but do ask about the federal government's impact on personal and national finances. So while it is not possible at this point to estimate identical models in both the federal and provincial arenas, it is possible to make a conservative comparison of the effects of attributions of responsibility in the two contexts.
The dependent variable is binary: those who voted for an opposition party versus those who did not vote or voted for the government. I choose to focus on the negative side of support for the government because a decision to support an opposition party is the clearest exercise of the mechanism of accountability. 15 The independent variables are positions on the issues mentioned above, party identification in both arenas, and a rating of the prime minister in the federal vote model. 16 Estimation of these vote-choice models is by probit with robust standard errors, and the coefficients displayed in the tables are marginal effects on the probability of voting for the opposition given a one-unit change on the independent variable with all other variables held constant at their means.
The independent variables of greatest interest are indicator (dummy) variables for voters who (1) saw a worsened situation in a given issue area and who blamed the government being evaluated and (2) saw a worsened situation in a given issue area and thought both orders of government were to blame. The resulting reference category is all those who would have little reason to punish the government: those who thought the situation no different or better, those who thought the situation worse but blamed no government, and those who thought the situation worse but blamed the other order of government. Unfortunately, the sample size is too small to permit separate indicators for those who did not know whom to blame or who thought the other order of government was to blame. Using the three categories, however, allows us to effectively compare the mean probability of voting against the government for those who did and did not pin the blame on one government, controlling for other factors. Are those who blame one government more likely to vote against that government than those whose assessment of responsibility is more diffuse?
The survey measured the relative responsibility of the two governments rather than government-specific responsibility as portrayed in the model. Nevertheless, given the wording of the response options to the responsibility questions ("mostly responsible" or "both") we should expect fully rational voters to produce a ratio of coefficients in the two groups of 15 Using a dependent variable with voting for the government versus all others produces substantively identical results (available on request from the author). IO I do not include ratings of the premiers because they are too close to the voting decision itself, for different reasons. In BC, Ujjal Dosanjh was too new for ratings to reflect much more than a summary judgment about the NDP government. Conversely, the Alberta government is seen more than anywhere else in Canada as the Klein government; ratings of Klein are virtually inseparable from judgments of the government.
somewhat less than 2 to 1. In other words, voters who see shared responsibility ("both") should dole out half of their punishment or reward to each order of government.
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A heteroskedastic probit model is employed in order to assess the possibility of issue bias.
18 It parameterizes the variance of a standard probit equation, essentially allowing for a test of factors that influence the overall power of the main model in predicting the dependent variable. If the estimation finds that blaming both governments reduces the influence of a given policy area on vote choice, then unless those voters fall back on other issues to evaluate the government (i.e., an issue bias), their votes should be more difficult to predict in the model of vote choice. In a heteroskedastic probit model, the coefficient on a dummy variable in the variance equation for voters who blame both governments will be positive and significant if there is no issue bias. If those people do, in fact, turn to other issues to evaluate the government, then the coefficient will be zero.
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THE ELECTORAL CONTEXTS
I examine three separate elections-Canada, Alberta, and British Columbiawhere each voter faced a federal and a provincial election. Fortunately for the purposes of both comparison and pooling the provincial data, the two most important issues in election discourse in the three contexts were health care and the economy. Beyond this similarity, the three elections considered here present a number of useful contrasts. In Alberta and Canada, the economic picture was positive, and long-standing governments-the Conservatives led by Ralph Klein in Alberta and the Liberal Party of Canada led by Jean Chretien in the federal arena-were reelected with increased majorities. In BC, the economy was in serious trouble, and the scandalridden New Democratic Party (NDP) government was decimated, winning only two of the province's 77 parliamentary seats. 20 After health care and the economy, the next most important issue in BC was the environment, where jurisdiction is shared, intergovernmental conflict is rampant, and 17 Technically, I also require an assumption that the total, aggregate responsibility for the two governments together cannot be twice that of the government being evaluated. Or, those who pin the blame on the government being evaluated have a higher mean value of R for that government than those who say responsibility is shared by the other government.
"R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm, "American Ambivalence Towards Racial Policies?" American Journal of Political Science 39 (November 1995): 1055-1082.
l9 Another method would be to add an interaction of the both-governments response on one issue with the judgment on another issue to see if that other issue was more important for those who could not assign exclusive responsibility on the first issue. I do this for health care, but in general the small sample size makes that more precise strategy impractical. 20 The federal election result was: Liberal Party of Canada 40.8 percent (172 seats), Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance 25.5 percent (66 seats), Bloc Quebecois 10.7 percent (38 seals), New Democratic party 8.5 percent (13 seats), and Progressive Conservative party 12.2 percent (12 seats). The British Columbia 2001 election result was: Liberal party of British Columbia 57.6 percent (77 seats), New Democratic party 21.6 percent (2 seats), Green party 12.4 percent (0 seats). The AJberta 2001 election result was: Progressive Conservative party 61.9 percent (74 seats), Liberal party of Alberta 27.33 percent (7 seats), and New Democratic party 8.0 percent (2 seats).
responsibility is therefore cloudy. By contrast, the third issue in Alberta was a rapidjump in energy prices, widely blamed on the provincial government's deregulation of the energy industry and understood to be an initiative unique to that province.
In all three elections, voters judged the most important issue to be health care, which makes it the focus of the present inquiry into accountability. In the federal campaign, health care was the priority for nearly half (47 percent) of the respondents who had a "most important issue." Four in five voters said it was "very important" to them "personally, in this Federal election." The environment, government debt, jobs, and tax cuts were "very important" for only half of the electorate. In the provincial election surveys, of those who gave a most important issue, 40 percent in Alberta and 32 percent in BC said it was health care, both strong pluralities.
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Judgments about health care were negative. In the federal campaign, nearly three-quarters of Canadians said "the quality of health care in Canada over the past five years" had "gotten worse," and only one in twenty said it had gotten better. Almost none disagreed with the premise of a question asking about "problems in health care in this province." The importance of health care, combined with predominantly negative judgments, presents a perfect opportunity to assess how accountability is mediated by attributions of responsibility in a federal context. All that is missing is connecting the situation to the action or inaction of governments, which these voters did. When asked in the provincial context which government bears most responsibility for "problems in the health care system," less than one in ten chose "not the fault of government." If there was ever an issue on which the public wanted to hold governments accountable, surely this was it. But as Richard Simeon and David Cameron suggest, citizens might ask: "Was it a result of a federal decision or a provincial decision; and if it was a combination of both, then what to do?" 22 Clearly, many Albertans and British Columbians were of the mind that one or the other government was to blame. This is clear from the responses to an open-ended question asking why there were problems in health care. Responses ranged from "cause they took so much out of it... the provincial government" to "not much money is given to the province from Ottawa." But shared blame was at least as common a response, for example: "bad management by the institutions of both governments as well as the health institutions." In fact, if there is a correct answer, it is probably "both," so an attribution of responsibility to one government should not be considered as a more informed, sophisticated response. One respondent probably got close to the truth by saying, "Alberta made so many cuts years ago and now 2l These figures would be substantially higher if non-issue mentions were excluded as valid responses. In BC, for instance, the modal response to the most important issue question was changing the government! "Richard Simeon and David Cameron, "Federalism and Democracy: An Oxymoron if Ever There Was One?" Canadian Federalism, eds., Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogslad (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 278-294. are trying to build it up again. But they are squabbling with Mr. Rock (down east) [the federal Minister of Health]. Everything is disjointed and pointing fingers doesn't work well. There's too much sqaubbling and not enough cooperation." That citizen was no less correct than the more articulate voter who said, "the main problem is because the federal government stopped transfer payments to the provinces . . . so the provinces were put in the position of having to cut back on health care expenses."
RESULTS
Attributions of Responsibility or Non-Attitudes
A preliminary question concerns whether attributions of responsibility in response to our questions mean anything at all. Table 1 shows the distribution of responses on the blame question. Given what is known about levels of information and sophistication in modern electorates, it is perfectly plausible that judgments of responsibility would be a classic case of nonattitudes.
2 ' Preliminary work on the current dataset found, instead, a surprising lack of non-attitudes, even coherence and consistency in these attributions. This is despite, or perhaps thanks to, the fact that three-quarters of Canadians agree that "It is often difficult to figure out which level of government is responsible for what." Most importantly, considered in the aggregate, the "both governments" answer is a sincere, legitimate, reasoned response. Consider how its use is distributed on different issues. "Both" was most common on health care where the involvement of both governments was part of the public debate. It was second most common on the environment where jurisdiction is shared. Energy prices in Alberta were blamed on the federal government by nearly no one. Also, a much greater proportion gave economic credit to the Alberta government than imposed economic blame on even the massively unpopular NDP in BC, likely the result of a well-known psychological bias favoring objects close to home.
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Nor is the "both governments" response a repository for ignorance or non-attitudes. First, only three of 452 respondents gave the response for all three issues. Second, dividing the sample in half by interest in politics shows no difference in the frequency of the "both" response. Third, more than one in five gave the response spontaneously to the CES health-care question even though the "both" response option was not explicitly offered. A "both governments" answer appears to be a sensible attribution of responsibility on issues where jurisdiction is shared and an intergovernmental blamegame is a feature of the communications environment. Most of those who say both governments are to blame for a situation probably mean it, with at least some justification.
But perhaps the use of the "both" response simply reflects weaker interest in that particular issue. Those who really care might be motivated enough to seek out information enabling them to pin blame on one or the other government. This possibility would threaten a simple test of the hypothesis that those who see both governments to blame on an issue do not exercise accountability as effectively on that issue. Table 2 shows attributions on health care for those who did and did not say health care was the most important issue for them in the provincial election. Those who were more concerned about health care were no less likely to give the "both governments" response. To put it another way, those who said both governments are to blame thought health care is just as important as did everyone else. None of this is to say that these attributions are highly crystallized attitudes based on a great deal of conscious information-gathering and subsequent reasoning. Table 3 shows the health-care blame question in the federal study crosstabulated with the similar question in the provincial studies a few months later. Only a third of the responses are consistent. This is obviously an underestimate of true consistency because the "both" and "not the fault of government" options were not explicitly offered in the federal survey. In fact, what movement there is (toward provincial responsibility) seems reasonable given that the provincial campaigns, preoccupied with health care, subtly reminded the public of provincial jurisdiction over health at every turn. Nonetheless, these are not top-of-mind attitudes, and we have a fairly small sample; so expectations for large and significant differences between these groups would be foolhardy. The central question of this research is addressed in tables 4 and 5. Because attributions of responsibility are not highly crystallized attitudes, they may be constructed "on the fly" in response to survey questions; hence, feelings about the governing party have the strong potential to affect these attitudes. Government partisans are very likely to deny their government's responsibility for a bad situation, while taking credit for a good one, and vice-versa for opposition partisans.
25 Therefore, each table shows two models. Model I does not control for party identification, while model II does.
26 I focus on model II in what follows. These tables show estimates of marginal effects derived from probit analysis; table entries give the change in probability of an anti-government vote as opposed to a vote for the government or abstention. Each of the independent variables is a dummy variable indicating a positive or negative judgment of current conditions in a policy area and attributions of responsibility to the government in question or both governments. Note that simultaneity is not a concern in the provincial estimation because the provincial partyidentification question was asked during the federal survey (CES). "Main entries are changes in probability of dependent variable from false to true on the dummy independent variables with other variables held constant at their mean. Standard errors correspond to these probabilities. Therefore, the results are interpretable analagously to the linear probability model estimated by OLS regression. Probability differences in bold are more than 1.64 times their associated standard error.
Responsibility and Vote Choice
Do those who blame one government and those who blame both governments for health-care troubles take their assessments to the polls in the same way? They clearly do not. Beginning with the provincial results, Table 4 shows that those who thought health care had gotten worse and thought the province mostly responsible were about 14 percent more likely to vote against the provincial government than everyone else. This is a powerful effect indeed, given the weak Findings on retrospective voting in recent Canadian elections. 27 The exercise of accountability is alive and well in this group. By contrast, their fellow voters who agreed that health care was worse but could not finger one government as "mostly responsible" were no more likely to oppose the government than were those who saw no deterioration in health service. The issue simply did not matter to their vote, and not for lack of concern because, as Table 2 indicated, about half of them thought health care was the most important election issue. Main entries are changes in probability of dependent variable from false to true on the dummy independent variables with other variables held constant at their mean. Standard errors correspond to these probabilities. Therefore, the results are interpretable analagously to the linear probability model estimated by OLS regression. Probability differences in bold are more than 1.64 times their associated standard error.
But there are two governments that might bear the brunt of unhappiness about the state of health care. Perhaps those who blamed both governments (who did not, on average, punish the provincial government) had held thê federal government's feet to the fire a few months earlier and were therefore reluctant to do the same to the provincial government. Not so. Table 5,  analogous to Table 4 but for the federal election of 2000, looks strikingly like Table 4 on the health-care issue. Those who saw a deterioration in health care and blamed the federal government were about 15 percent more likely to vote against the federal Liberal party. Shared blame produced the same result as in the provincial case: no connection between a worsening health-care situation and voting against the government. Both groups saw government in general to blame for the situation in health care, but those who saw equal responsibility could not or would not hold either government to account for the situation.
How widespread is this seeming inability to hold government accountable on health care? These results do not mean much without proportions of the electorate attached to each category. An optimist might even propose that this result is possible if every voter blames one government in one context but says "both" in their attribution of responsibility in the other context. In that case, we would be able to say that many citizens hold only one government exclusively to account for the situation and accordingly do not blame the other government, even if they see that other government as partly responsible for the situation. These voters would be recognizing that responsibility is indeed logically zero-sum and refrain from heaping further blame on a government when the blame has been fully apportioned to the other order of government in a federation. Table 6 provides relevant evidence by cross-tabulating blame for health care in the federal and provincial contexts. A total of 316 respondents believed the quality of health care was declining and attributed responsibility to government(s) in at least one of the surveys. A bare majority of these (52 percent), identified with a black background in the table, do pin principal responsibility on one of the governments being evaluated and are consistent or choose "both" when evaluating the other government. Thus, roughly half of the electorate fell into a group that did, on average, translate negative feelings about health care into an increased probability of voting for an opposition party. A few (6 percent, gray background) blame the government in question at both levels, switching from federal responsibility in November 2000 to provincial blame six months later. This leaves more than two in five voters (41 percent, in the white background in Table 6 ) who thought health care was deteriorating and were willing to say government(s) bear some responsibility, but who did not, on average, translate this attitude into a vote against the government. Forty percent of the electorate had good reason to hold a government accountable but failed to do so.
Moving beyond health care, the other issues tell a different story, for good reason. The economy and energy prices produce results in Table 4 that are bang on the expectation that the ratio of coefficients from the "mostly one" to "both governments" groups would be somewhat less than two to one. Compared to those who saw no economic change, voters who thought the province's economy worse (3 percent in Alberta, 73 percent in BC) and blamed the province were one-third (32 percent) more likely to vote against the government. Voters who assessed joint responsibility were only one-fifth (20 percent) more likely to punish the government. As for positive assessments, Alberta voters did, contrary to some expectations, credit their government for good times. They shied away from an anti-government vote by about 15 percent as compared to those who saw no economic change.
These results are somewhat reassuring, in that frustrated accountability when both governments are implicated in policy outcomes did not generalize outside the health-care realm. However, there are other reasons to be more pessimistic. The relative ease of gathering some information about the economy could mean that voters compensated for the difficulty of assessing responsibility in health care by falling back on assessments of the economy. Futhermore, despite the fact that the BC and Alberta economies were both riding different trajectories from the national one, so provincial responsibility is a reasonable inference, these governments very likely had far less influence on their provincial economy than they did on the state of health care in the province. Insofar as this account is correct, some voters held a government accountable for something over which it has relatively little control because they were confused by the intergovernmental morass on an issue where governments do have somewhat more control.
The other possibility is that voters fell back on an issue where a government does indeed seem both in control of, and ultimately responsible for, a policy outcome. This looks to be the case on energy prices in Alberta. While only one Albertan in three attributed responsibility to government, more than three-quarters of these 53 respondents blamed the province, while only one voter blamed the federal government exclusively. Alberta's policy distinctiveness in deregulating the energy market was well publicized and well-known to respondents (in an open-ended probe, half mentioned deregulation specifically). Again the ratio of changes in probabilities of voting against the government in the two groups is close to two-to-one: 29 percent (mostly province) and 14 percent (both) more than those who said the energy companies or no one was to blame. Not surprisingly, where information useful for making accurate attributions of responsibility was available, voters seemed to do so and, therefore, brought their attitudes on a salient issue to bear on their electoral choices.
Opinions on the environment in the provincial elections (Table 4 ) and the economy in the federal election (Table 5) were not connected with vote choice. The only other finding worth noting is an unexpectedly positive relationship between dissatisfaction with the provincial environment and support for the federal Liberals. This relationship demonstrates that not all retrospective evaluations of government performance are created equal. The environment question likely did not elicit real evaluations of the state of the environment because information relevant to that assessment is usually scarce, unreliable, and contested. Instead, it is rife with projection from general ideological orientations and is therefore a measure of a forwardlooking or "prospective" criterion for the voting decision. Those who said the environment was worse were those least likely to be supporters of the main opposition choice in federal politics in BC, the right-of-center Canadian Alliance. In the provincial election in BC, the environment was a decent suspect for retrospective voting, but the result was negligible. Those who thought the environment worse were probably more likely to remain NDP supporters or vote for the Green party than to go with the overwhelming opposition party, the much more market-oriented Liberals. These two findings demonstrate the general point that retrospective evaluations and attributions of responsibility are not always independent of prospective policyjudgments. The retrospective criteria necessary to enforce accountability on a government are always a subset of the total matrix of factors influencing individual vote choices.
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
Health care, then, presents a conundrum. The inability of 40 percent of the electorate to exercise accountability on this issue is troubling because it was the consensus choice as the most important issue in all three elections. One possibility is that these voters might have fallen back on another issue, producing, in the aggregate, what I call issue bias, where voters are unable to use an issue they care about in their voting calculus because responsibility is unclear. Alternately, they might simply have had less to go on when they made up their minds. Does shared responsibility distort issue priorities in the exercise of accountability, or does it just make choices more random? A heteroskedastic probit model enables an assessment of whether those voters who see shared responsibility in health care make decisions that are less predictable, or more random. The answer is firmly negative, so the results are not shown. Given that these voters do not make more variable choices, they must be falling back on other criteria for their voting decision. The prima facie evidence is that there is a bias against an issue where responsibility is unclear.
Investigating this more closely, the bias pushes directly toward the energy issue in Alberta. The energy issue was influential only for those voters who said both governments were to blame for health care. The change in the probability of a non-government vote for those who blamed the province for energy prices is a whopping 53 percent (standard error =10 percent) among those who blamed both governments on health, but a statistically insignificant 9 percent for everyone else.
28 Yet in BC, a comparable repository for issue voting could not be found among the "both governments" group on health care. The sample is small, so too much should not be made of this finding. But the initial evidence is that in making the kind of retrospective judgments necessary to hold a government accountable, voters rank issues in terms of importance, and then, if they cannot assign responsibility on some issues, they fall back on less important ones. To fully investigate this possibility, subsequent work on a larger sample will require a model that makes respondents' issue-weights zero-sum and then parameterizes the weight given to each issue based on concern and clarity of responsibility.
CONCLUSION
These are early days for the study of how voters respond to the challenge of evaluating governments on policy matters in a federal context. Although there has been a long tradition of research comparing voting behavior, social and policy cleavages, and partisanship in federal and sub-federal politics, 29 no precursors can be cited as theoretical or empirical guides to the research question addressed here. The results presented here are all the more provisional given the limited resources that were available for an integrated federal-provincial election survey. Surveys were conducted in only two provinces, with small sample sizes, and with only three issues that appeared to be salient but might not have struck a chord with all citizens. The other coefficients are nearly identical, so I do not present a full Although the contrasts between the two provincial elections are striking and useful for some purposes, the coronation of the Alberta government and the demolition of the BC government were undoubtedly extreme cases where accountability may not present a subtle enough face for much to be generalized very far.
Nevertheless, the relatively uncontroversial argument that attribution of responsibility is a necessary condition for issue voting was fairly well supported here. The most disturbing finding is that two in five voters who saw a deterioration in the quality of health care seemed unable to punish either government for the situation. However, this did not generalize to other issues, where those who blamed both governments did punish their governments, but, sensibly, to a lesser extent than those who pinned the blame or credit on only one order of government.
Why might health care be different? Each policy issue has its own constellation of de jure and de/actojurisdiction, intergovernmental conflict or cooperation, and level of prominence in public discourse. Intertwined jurisdiction over the natural environment, for instance, results in frequent intergovernmental conflicts. Although these conflicts are sometimes taken seriously by the media, they must seem remote in most cases to most citizens, who simply want clean air and water. On the economy, figuring out de facto jurisdiction in all economically relevant areas would be too complex for experts, let alone citizens, yet economic outcomes are pinned on both orders of government quite strongly. The economy is likely so important that citizens and the media do follow the bet-hedging strategy of holding both governments accountable for the same outcomes with the hope that something will give.
30
In Canada, health care combines simple de jure responsibility with complex de facto funding and management arrangements. Relevant information ranges from the amount of the federal government's blockgrant Canada Health and Social Transfer, to the more local and specific provincial health-insurance regimes and the relationship between regional health authorities and provincial health ministries. Voters must negotiate this intergovernmental jungle in making attributions of responsibility. Add to this the fact that the intergovernmental nature of health care is prominent in media coverage in Canada. Citizens hear about federal-provincial collaboration on technology, the federal government's targetted spending on equipment, threats by the federal government to withdraw federal transfers to the provinces if they allow private clinics and extra billing by doctors, withdrawal of federal funding through the Canada Health and Social Transfer, and interprovincial inequalities in care. Given this information environment for citizens, it is a wonder that anyone is willing to pronounce one or the other order of government mostly responsible for shortfalls in service. s0 This mechanism is described in Albert Brelon, Competitive Governments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
A central question remains unanswered, however. Why is health care unlike the economy, where both governments get blamed? Surely health care is important enough that voters should hedge their bets and vent their displeasure at both governments. Is it simply that there is more uncertainty in assessments of responsibility on health, even if the greater certainty on the economy is fundamentally wrong? Further survey work employing direct measures of uncertainty about responsibility is necessary to answer that question.
31
The federal context is potentially a powerful influence on the exercise of electoral accountability. Federations have traded off some of the clarity of responsibility for administrative efficiency or flexibility, government closer to the people, more accurate preference articulation and satisfaction, 32 and a form of checks and balances for parliamentary governments. 33 The extent to which these advantages are realized has been investigated far more fully than the extent of possible compromises to democratic accountability.
34
This study has begun to assess the cost of voters' necessary attempts to hack their way through the intergovernmental jungle. The cost could be fairly high when a substantial portion of the electorate holds no government accountable for shortcomings in the policy area uppermost in their minds. Perhaps a return to more clearly demarcated jurisdictions could make this problem go away, but that is impractical in modern federations. The question is really one of balance. If overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities have other benefits, do they outweigh or offset the threat to electoral accountability identified here?
